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6.1  Introduction 
Despite strong opposition from labor unions and widespread, often negative, 
press reports on ownership changes through mergers and acquisitions, there 
have  been few studies of  the impact of  ownership change on labor. To  our 
knowledge, there are only two published studies on this issue. The first, by 
Brown and Medoff (1988), uses a sample of mostly small firms from one state, 
Michigan. They find that, except for divestitures, ownership changes have little 
impact on either employment or the average wage. 
The second study, by Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992b), examines the impact 
of ownership change on wages and employment in both auxiliary (central of- 
fice) and production establishments. They find ownership change to be associ- 
ated with reductions in both wages and employment in central offices but to 
have little effect at production plants. Since the chief operating officer’s salary 
is a large component of the average wage in small firms, the Brown and Medoff 
results appear consistent with those of Lichtenberg and Siegel. These studies 
suggest that managers and white-collar workers suffer the most following own- 
ership change, but overall, the effects on labor, particularly production work- 
ers, appear to be relatively small. 
While the Brown-Medoff and Lichtenberg-Siege1 studies certainly make 
significant contributions to the empirical literature on the impact of ownership 
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changes on labor, several important issues need to be addressed.  These include 
the representativeness of their samples, the measurement and identification  of 
ownership change, and the appropriate unit of analysis (firms vs. plants). For 
example, the data set used by  Brown and Medoff is for a single state, and 
most of the firms in their sample are small. Moreover, their sample excludes 
establishments  located outside Michigan even when they are owned by Michi- 
The sample used by Lichtenberg and Siegel is much broader, covering the 
entire U.S. manufacturing sector. However, their sample includes only large, 
surviving plants in the 1972-81 period. Smaller surviving plants and exiting 
plants of all sizes are excluded. Restriction of the sample to survivors prevents 
Lichtenberg and Siegel from analyzing the effects of  ownership changes on 
plant closing. 
In this study, we examine these and other data problems and measurement 
issues in the estimation of the impacts of ownership change on labor, For this 
purpose, we created an unbalanced panel of  more than 28,000 manufacturing 
establishments from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database 
(LRD). It covers the entire population of  the U.S.  food-producing industry 
(SIC 20) in 1977. We choose the food-manufacturing industry because it ex- 
hibits a substantial  number of ownership changes that involve a significant por- 
tion of total industry shipments during the period under study. At the same 
time, it provides a large, tractable set of firms and plants for empirical work. 
Most important, the data set is comprehensive, covering plants of all sizes.’ 
These data allow us to construct a data set that contains firms undergoing 
ownership changes involving control2 and a comparable group of  firms not 
experiencing such changes. They also enable us to keep track of the activities 
of all food-producing firms and their components (i.e., plants) at discrete five- 
year intervals through 1987. Specifically, these data allow categorization of 
firms at the beginning of a period into those that operate continuously, those 
that close, and those that are sold to other firms. Similarly, the plants of  a 
particular firm at the end of  the period can be broken down into those the 
firm originally owned, those it acquired from other firms, and those that are 
newly constructed. 
Our analysis leads to the following principal findings for the food industry. 
First, the growth rates of wages, employment, and labor productivity for the 
typical acquired plant (and originally owned plant of  an acquiring firm) are 
higher than those for the typical plant of a nonacquiring firm in the postacquisi- 
tion period. Second, to a lesser extent, the typical worker in both types of 
acquiring firms’ plants also enjoyed higher growth rates of wages, employ- 
ment, and productivity after an acquisition. Third, plants that changed owners 
gan firms. 
1. Also, data for this industry at both the plant and firm  level are “cleaned ready for this particu- 
2. See section 6.3.2 for a discussion of the measurement issues involved in relating ownership 
lar analysis. 
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show a greater likelihood of survival than those that did not. These three find- 
ings strongly reject the hypothesis that ownership changes through mergers 
and acquisitions cut wages and employment and reduce labor productivity. 
None of the findings are obtained using firm-level data, which suggests that 
plant-level data are more appropriate than firm-level data for studying the ef- 
fects of ownership changes on the structure and performance of the firm. 
We  discuss the relationships among ownership change, productivity, wages, 
and employment in section 6.2. In section 6.3, we describe the data. In particu- 
lar, we  discuss how the LRD  data were used to identify ownership change 
in our sample. In section 6.4, we report some simple statistics describing the 
characteristics of firms and plants that experienced ownership change. Our re- 
gression analysis is discussed in section 6.5. Section 6.6 reports the regression 
results. Discussions of the results are presented in section 6.7. The last section 
proposes directions for future research and concludes the paper. 
6.2  Ownership Change and Labor 
Brown and Medoff (1988) suggest that much of  the press and labor union 
concern with ownership change might stem from extensive media coverage of 
a small and highly selective group of  transactions. There are several issues 
involved here. Changing ownership itself need not be associated with other 
changes in the operation of the firm; but ownership changes involving “con- 
trol”-the  type of  transaction examined here-typically  lead to operational 
 change^.^ Some ownership changes involving control-hostile  takeovers, for 
example-derive  their notoriety from the wholesale upheavals that may  ac- 
company them: management dismissal, plant closures, abrogation of pension 
benefits, and wage reduction. Even though hostile takeovers are not typical of 
ownership change transactions, other forms of  ownership change, such as 
friendly mergers, also lead to significant operational changes. But even assum- 
ing control changes and operations are affected, does economic theory offer 
clear guidance as to the impact of ownership changes on labor? 
In fact, there are not clear theoretical links between ownership change and 
labor market outcomes. For example, at first glance the consequences for em- 
ployment of  ownership changes to create market power appear clear: market 
power is exercised by reducing output and raising prices, and reduced output 
will unfavorably affect employment. But this is not the whole story. A strong 
union might reasonably be expected to share in the monopoly rents. 
As another example, many have argued that the dominant incentive during 
the conglomerate merger wave of  the late 1960s to early 1970s was empire 
building  by  managers  who  were  not  operating  in  shareholders’  interests 
(Mueller 1969, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny  1989). The merger wave  of  the 
3. E.g., in the case of  a public firm,  ownership is constantly changing as shareholders buy and 
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1980s has been viewed as a response to the managerial excesses of the con- 
glomerate merger wave in the early period. In this view, the acquisitions of the 
1980s were motivated by  the gains available from replacement of inefficient 
managers of poorly performing firms (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Lichtenberg 
1992; Jensen 1993). Arguably, the net effect of such shifts on aggregate pro- 
ductivity (and thus wages) and jobs is relatively small. 
The foregoing discussion offers an a priori reason for skepticism concerning 
the aggregate net effects of ownership changes on labor markets. However, 
even if the aggregate net effects of ownership changes are small, the relocation 
of jobs and workers associated with them can be substantial. Relocation of 
jobs is an important ingredient in the shifting of resources from lower to higher 
valued uses and is extremely important to aggregate productivity growth (e.g., 
see Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger 1994; Baily, Campbell, and Hulten 
1992). 
Recent studies also find ownership change associated with productivity 
growth. Using longitudinally  linked firm-establishment data in the LRD, Lich- 
tenberg and Siegel (1992a) and McGuckin and Nguyen (1994) conclude that 
ownership changes are positively associated with productivity growth in the 
U.S. manufacturing sector for the 1980s merger wave. Baldwin (1995) obtains 
a similar result using Canadian establishment data? 
The positive association between productivity growth and ownership change 
is consistent with most merger theories.s A key issue is the source of the gains. 
For example, one leading hypothesis is that ownership  changes are undertaken 
for managerial discipline reasons. Managerial discipline takeovers are gener- 
ally associated with poorly performing businesses that can be reorganized and 
restructured to make them more productive. The importance of this motive for 
ownership change is supported  empirically by Lichtenberg (1992). In addition, 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992b) find evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
ownership changes lead to the elimination of jobs:  downsizing and  lower 
wages for central offices in firms undergoing ownership changes. But Lich- 
tenberg and Siegel find little in the way  of employment effects at production 
plants. Thus they do not find that ownership change is associated with loss of 
manufacturing jobs. 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1994) reject the managerial discipline theory as a 
broad-based explanation of most ownership change. They reach this conclu- 
sion because their data show that it is high, not low, productivity establish- 
ments that are most likely to experience ownership change. Matsusaka (1993b) 
4. These results are in sharp contrast with those found by  previous researchers whose samples 
typically consisted of data only for large firms. E.g., most industrial organization studies have not 
found gains associated with ownership change (e.g., Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987). As discussed 
in more detail below, the new microdata appear to have uncovered relationships “hidden” in the 
more aggregative firm data. 
5. Finding productivity gains positively related to ownership change does not fit well with any 
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and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) report similar results: corporate acquirers 
generally purchase good businesses (productive plants) rather than bad busi- 
nesses. This suggests that the gains in most ownership changes are associated 
with efficiencies generated by  synergies, which result from combining opera- 
tions. 
For a subset of large establishments, McGuckin and Nguyen (1994) find- 
consistent with Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992a), whose sample consists pri- 
marily of larger plants-that  establishments changing owners have low initial 
productivity and improve following the ownership change. Thus, for very large 
establishments, the results are consistent with managerial discipline motives 
for ownership change. Matsusaka (1993a) draws a similar conclusion for the 
1960s and 1970s using firm-level data and a somewhat different test. 
Despite the new evidence that a substantial proportion of the observed own- 
ership changes represent combinations of efficient operations and subsequent 
improvements in productivity performance, the impact of  ownership change 
on employment cannot be distinguished on theoretical grounds alone. It is pos- 
sible for the positive association between ownership change and productivity 
growth to arise in ways that will, on net, have little effect on total employment 
of the firm. Productivity improvements could come from efficiencies leading 
to growth, upsizing the firm  and increasing employment, rather than from 
downsizing. But even when synergies are the dominant motive for the owner- 
ship change, downsizing is possible. Similarly, one can expect either increases 
or decreases in wages following ownership changes. Ownership changes lead- 
ing to productivity increases will tend to increase wages unless all of the rents 
from the ownership reorganization accrue to management. The relatively small 
gains to acquiring firms’ shareholders found in finance studies are consistent 
with the view that all the rents do not accrue to acquiring firms. On the other 
hand, the large premiums paid to acquired firms’ shareholders suggest that 
labor is not a primary recipient of ownership reorganization rents. Even in the 
absence of rents to labor, however, the average wage could increase if owner- 
ship change is associated with shifts to higher levels of worker skills. 
To  sort out these issues, we turn to a plant-level data set that covers both 
acquiring and nonacquiring firms and examine the relationships among owner- 
ship change, productivity, wages, and employment at both the firm and estab- 
lishment levels. 
6.3  Data and Measurement Issues 
In this section, we focus our discussion on the data used and measurement 
issues associated with this type of research. First, we describe our data set and 
the details of  its construction. Second, we discuss the concept of  ownership 
change, report our techniques for identifying ownership change, and compare 
our concepts and techniques with those used by Lichtenberg and Siegel and by 
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out how this can affect empirical results. Finally, we compare our data to those 
used in previous studies. 
6.3.1  Data and Sample Design 
Data Source 
Our data are taken from the LRD, which contains data on output, employ- 
ment, and costs for individual U.S. manufacturing establishments. The output 
data include total value of  shipments and value added. Data on costs include 
information on capital, labor, energy, materials, and selected purchased ser- 
vices. The employment data contain total and production workers, and their 
wages, as well as worked hours for production workers. 
An important feature of the LRD is its plant classification and identification 
information, including firm affiliation, location, product and industry, and vari- 
ous status codes that identify, among other things, birth, death, and ownership 
changes. These identifying codes are used in developing both the longitudinal 
plant linkages and ownership linkages among plank6 
Sample Design and Coverage 
We  first identified each food-manufacturing  plant operating in 1977 using 
the Census Bureau’s SIC codes. Because 1977 is a census year, the entire popu- 
lation of food-manufacturing plants and firms is available. We  then identified 
plants that had ownership change during the periods 1977-82  and 1982-87 
(see section 6.3.2 for detailed discussion of  identifying ownership change). 
After identifying all plants that experienced ownership change in these peri- 
ods, we use each plant’s 1977 and 1987 census firm identification number (ID) 
to identify sellers (acquired firms), buyers (acquiring firms-i.e.,  firms that 
acquired at least one food-manufacturing plant during the period), and firms 
that  did  not  have  any  plant  experiencing ownership change. Finally,  we 
grouped all plants under common ownership in the beginning year (1977) of 
the study period into three categories: (1) surviving own plants-owned  by the 
firm in 1977 and surviving through 1987; (2) closed plants-existed  in 1977 
but closed by  1987; and (3) sold plants-owned  in  1977 but sold to other 
firms by  1987. Using a similar classification for 1987 gives three categories 
for acquiring firms: (1) surviving own plants, (2) acquired plants, and (3) new 
plants. Nonacquiring firms include only categories 1 and 3. These categories 
allow us to examine shifts in the composition of the firm over time. 
We  identify ownership changes occumng during the periods 1977-82  and 
1982-87. Each period encompasses two Census of Manufactures years so that 
we are confident of correctly identifying all ownership changes. In noncensus 
years information is available only for a sample of  plants. The full period 
1977-87  includes the beginning and ending years of the latest merger move- 
6. A more complete description of  the LRD is given in McGuckin and Pascoe (1988). 213  Measuring the Impact of Ownership Change on Labor 
ment, which extended until 1986 or 1987. Our primary focus is on ownership 
changes between 1977 and 1982. This allows us to evaluate performance five 
to nine years after an ownership change transaction. This provides plenty of 
time for the acquiring firm to integrate acquisitions into the firm, or to dispose 
of them. Using 1977-87  as the measurement interval for our performance mea- 
sures also avoids the influence of the 1982 recession. 
For the period 1977-82,  we identified 733 firms that sold at least one food- 
manufacturing plant. These 733 firms sold in  total 2,111 plants (including 
1,573 food plants and 538 nonfood plants) to 732 acquiring firms. As shown 
in table 6.1, the 732 acquiring firms consisted of 93 single-unit firms, 284 new 
multiunit firms, and 355 multiunit firms. Of the 284 new multiunit firms, 134 
entered manufacturing by acquiring only one manufacturing food plant. Each 
of  the remaining  150 nonmanufacturing firms acquired at least two or more 
plants. The 355 multiunit manufacturing firms that operated in the food indus- 
try in  1977 had the biggest role in the  1977-82  acquisition movement. To- 
gether, they acquired 1,455 of the 2, ll  1 transferred plants (68.9 percent) and 
accounted for $37,435 of the $38,764 million of total value of shipments ac- 
quired over the period (98 percent). Of  the remaining 656 plants, 93 plants 
were acquired by  93 single-unit firms, 134 plants were acquired by  132 non- 
manufacturing firms, and 43 1 plants were sold to 150 other nonmanufacturing 
multiunit firms. 
For the nonacquiring group, we identified 17,409 firms that had at least one 
food manufacturing plant in 1977. Of  the 17,409 firms, 15,067 were single- 
unit firms, 1,185 were nonmanufacturing firms having one food manufacturing 
plant, and 1,157 were multiunit manufacturing firms. These 1,157 firms owned 
7,701 manufacturing plants (both food and nonfood plants) in 1977. 
Thus our data cover the entire 1977 population of food-manufacturing firms 
in the United States. This population consists of  18,141 firms, of which 17,763 
firms operated primarily in the food industry. The 18,141 firms owned 30,086 
plants in  1977, of  which 23,980 plants were owned by  food firms and 6,106 
plants were owned by  nonfood firms. 
6.3.2 
Ownership and Control 
“Ownership” refers to the person(  s) that controls particular resources in the 
economy. Owners make the decisions about the use of these scarce resources. 
When resources change hands, the new owners typically change the way  the 
resources are used. Therefore, ownership and ownership change are important 
aspects of economic growth and have important implications for economic pol- 
icies. For example, antitrust authorities (the U.S. Department of  Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission) are concerned with the effects of  ownership 
change on output and pricing decisions. The Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion protects minority shareholders’ (owners’) rights and protects the public 
Ownership Change: Concept and Measurement Table 6.1  Acquiring and Nonacquiring Food-Producing Firms, 1977 
Number of Firms  Total 
1977 Labor  Shipments 
(hundred  Total  Average  Productivity 
Firm  Food”  Nonfood  Total  thousand)  Employment  Employment  1987 6) 
Acquiringfim 1977-82 
1. Single unit  62  31  93  1,381  14,694  158  73.94 
2.  Nonmanufacturing, one food plant  109  25  134  1,798  17,554  131  75.06 
3. Nonmanufacturing, more than one food plant  103  47  150  9,623  75,600  504  86.73 
4. Multiunit manufacturing  236  119  355  172,164  1,203,095  3,389  118.82 
Total  510  222  732  184,967  1,278,695  1,747  97.75 
1.  Single unit  15,067  -  15,067  26,124  286,273  19  67.20 
Nonacquiringfirmsb  1977-82 
2. Nonmanufacturing, one food plant  1,185  1,185  8,361  82,950  70  73.67 
3. MultiuniE  1,001  156  1,157  129,466  1,253,03  1  1,083  89.42 
Total  17,253  156  17,409  163,931  1,622,254  93  69.08 
- 
=Firms  are allocated to food or nonfood industries based on the largest category of shipments. 
bThese firms had no acquisitions in the 1978-82  period but may have had acquisitions in the 1983-87  period. 
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against securities fraud. These issues often become important when ownership 
shifts from one person or group to another. The Department of  Labor is con- 
cerned with issues involving worker rights and working conditions that can 
change when ownership changes. Moreover, in the continuing debate on the 
relative roles of  small and large firms in job creation and destruction, it  is 
important to measure ownership and ownership change correctly. 
None of the ownership concepts used in the databases underlying the studies 
considered in this paper (or any study) exactly match those needed for policy 
purposes. The key issue for policy is “control.” Measuring control is particu- 
larly difficult for corporations. For corporations, the extent of  ownership is 
determined by  the proportion of the ownership shares held by  an owner and 
the legal rules for exercising those shares. Roughly speaking, if a firm acquires 
more than 50 percent of the shares of  another company, it obtains a majority 
of that firm and the ability to control it. It, of course, may decide not to exercise 
this right. But even without majority control, an owner may effectively control 
another company. The issue of who controls corporate assets has a long history. 
It was raised over 50 years ago by Berle and Means (1932) and is the subject 
of a large literature. For our purposes, we simply note that in some contexts 
criteria other than 50 percent ownership are used to approximate a level of 
ownership at which control is exerted. For example, for many securities trans- 
actions, a company is considered to be under the control of  another if  more 
than 10 percent of its stock is obtained by one investor. 
Even if one settles on the conceptual issues and can precisely define “con- 
trol,” and thereby ownership, it is not simple to define ownership or measure 
ownership and ownership change in plant- and firm-level data sets like the 
LRD. These issues and a comparison of our methods for measuring ownership 
and ownership change with those of Lichtenberg and Siege1 (1992a, 1992b) 
and Brown and Medoff (1988) are presented next. 
Measuring Ownership and Ownership Change 
Both Lichtenberg and Siegel’s study and ours use the LRD as the source of 
the data set. The ownership concepts in the LRD reflect the LRD’s roots in the 
Census Bureau’s Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL), which is used 
as a sampling frame for most Census Bureau surveys of businesses with em- 
ployment.’  The SSEL contains current information on ownership, address, 
classification, employment, payroll, and operational status of  each establish- 
ment. It also includes limited historical information. The SSEL is based on 
administrative information maintained in Internal Revenue Service (IRS), So- 
cial Security Administration, and (since 1990) Bureau of Labor Statistics re- 
7. The SSEL is described in Bureau of the Census (1979), and its role in  the Census Bureau’s 
manufacturing establishment surveys is described in Cole, Petrik, and Struble (1995). The SSEL 
currently covers the following economic sectors: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transporta- 
tion and communication, wholesale, retail, finance, insurance, and real estate, services, and pub- 
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cords. To facilitate the tracking of ownership at the plant level for the multiunit 
companies in the SSEL, the Census Bureau collects information from all 
multiunit companies in the economic censuses (every five years) and from a 
sample of companies in the Company Organization Survey (COS) in non- 
census years. Moreover, ownership information on multiunit companies is of- 
ten obtained from other ongoing Census Bureau surveys. 
For the Census Bureau, a company (company A) owns another company 
(company B) if either of two basic criteria is met: (1) company A owns more 
than 50 percent of the voting stock of company B or (2) company A has the 
power to direct the management and policies of company B. Census Bureau 
data collection forms ask respondents whether they own or are owned by other 
companies. If the answer is yes, the forms request the name, address, and em- 
ployer identification number (EIN) of the owned or owning companies. Each 
business with paid employees is required to obtain a nine-digit EIN from 
the IRS. 
The IRS does not require an enterprise to obtain a unique EIN for each 
location (establishment) at which it operates-EINs  are assigned to facilitate 
companies’ tax reporting, and they can cover anything from a single establish- 
ment of a multiunit company up to the entire company. Therefore, the Census 
Bureau cannot assign a unique ID to each establishment from EINs alone. But 
it does use the EIN along with information from the COS in constructing its 
ID numbers. In  the LRD, the ID numbers of particular plants can and do 
change over time. An ID change often indicates an ownership change, but it 
can indicate other things as well. The following describes the process we used 
to identify ownership changes and  separate them from other types of  ID 
changes. 
To identify ownership changes in the LRD requires three steps: (1) Identify 
plants that change firm ID between two census years. (2) Within this set of 
plants, use certain codes in  the LIZD,  called coverage codes (CC codes), to 
identify directly a subset of plants that change ownership for a particular rea- 
son. (3) From the remaining plants, identify further ownership changes indi- 
rectly. 
In step 1 in identifying mergers, we observe the change in the firm ID num- 
bers of each establishment  in the period under study. A change in ID can mean 
any of the following: 
1. The establishment was sold to another firm-a  true ownership change 
(merger). 
2.  A multiunit firm (a firm that owns more than one plant) closed or sold all 
of its plants but one and became a single-unit firm (a firm with only one plant). 
3.  A single-unit firm became a multiunit firm by opening new  plants or 
acquiring existing plants. (Note that the ID variable in the LRD for each plant 
of a multiunit firm incorporates a code for the firm to which the plant belongs.) 
4. A multiunit or single-unit firm underwent a legal reorganization (e.g., 217  Measuring the Impact of Ownership Change on  Labor 
partnership to corporation) that spurred a firm ID change without a change in 
actual ownership. 
5. Errors-erroneous  ID changes can occur. 
To  identify most true ownership changes (mergers or divestitures)-step 
2-we  need to use information available in the LRD in addition to the ID 
variable. The main additional information is in the census CC codes assigned 
to establishments in the census or Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). The 
CC codes are two-digit numbers indicating the status of the establishment in 
the survey. In particular, there is a CC code indicating that an establishment 
was acquired by  another company. For a complete list of  CC codes, see the 
LRD documentation (Bureau of the Census 1992). 
Ideally, all new firm ID and CC codes would be recorded during the years 
that establishments change status (including ownership), so that it would be 
easy to identify mergers. In practice, this does not always happen. Except for 
a set of large ASM establishments, neither changes in ID nor proper CC codes 
are systematically recorded during the years of  status change. In many cases, 
particularly for small establishments, a change in firm ID appears one or more 
years before the corresponding CC code change occurs to explain the reason 
for the ID change. The reverse is also possible: the CC code can indicate an 
ownership change before the ID changes. To mitigate these problems, we ex- 
amined CC codes in the years before and after the ID change. However, these 
procedures have two problems. First, in ASM (noncensus) years, not all plants 
are in the data set, and in particular, when the ASM panel changes (in years 
ending in 4 and 9), the set of noncertainty cases (the smaller plants) turns over 
completely. Second, for a number of single-unit non-ASM establishments (in 
census years), proper CC codes are not assigned at all. 
So, using CC codes allows us to identify only a portion of the establishments 
that have  ID changes due to ownership changes. However, as table 6.2 indi- 
cates, this is a large portion. The table summarizes the results for plants that 
are classified in the food industry. We  identified 2,010 establishments that 
changed ID between 1977 and 1982. The CC codes gave reasons for ID change 
for 85.7 percent (1,722) of these establishments-of  these, 1,507 (75 percent) 
were acquired and 215 (10.7 percent) changed ID for other known reasons, 
such as reclassification, combined reports, firm reorganization, and so forth. 
The remaining  14.3 percent of  establishments (288) were not assigned a CC 
code. 
For the 288 plants with unexplained ID changes, we brought together initial 
and ending firm IDS for all plants that were owned by the firm in question. For 
example, suppose the LRD shows that plant A belonged to firm X in 1977 and 
to firm Y in 1982, but the 1982 CC code for plant A does not show this as an 
ownership change. Suppose, however, we know that firm Y also acquired at 
least one other plant from firm X between 1977 and 1982. In this case, it seems 
likely that firm Y bought plant A as well, and we code plant A accordingly. By Table 6.2  Identifying Ownership Change in SIC 20 (Food), 197742 
Ownership Change Identified Using CC Codes 
and Matching Techniques  Ownership Change Identified Using CC Codes Only 
Number  Percentage  Average 
Reason for ID  Change  of Plants  of Plants  Employment 
Acquired  1,507  75.0  177.9 
Converted  160  8.0  112.8 
Error  4  0.2  D 
Reclassified  18  0.9  60.8 
Reorganized  22  1.0  124.8 
Duplicate  2  0.1  D 
Sold to nonmanufacturing firm  6  0.3  D 
Split  3  0.1  D 
Nonidentifiable  288  14.3  89.1 
Number  Percentage  Average 
of Plants  of Plants  Employment 
1,573  78.3  174.2 
160  8.0  112.8 
2  1  .o  D 
4  0.2  D 
18  0.9  60.8 
22  1  .o  124.8 
6  0.3  D 
3  0.1  D 
222  11.0  88.5 
Total  2,010  100.0  158.0  2,010  100.0  158.0 
Nore: D = suppressed to prevent disclosure of confidential information on individual firms. 219  Measuring the Impact of  Ownership Change on Labor 
making such assumptions, we increase the number of plants identified as ac- 
quired by  66 to 1,573.8 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992b) use two separate data sets for their studies. 
One data set is taken from the Census Bureau’s auxiliary reports of the 1977 
and 1982 economic censuses. This data set is used to study the effects of own- 
ership change on central office employees. The other data set is a balanced 
panel extracted from the LRD. It contains 20,493 U.S. manufacturing plants 
that continuously operated during the period 1972-8 1. This sample is about 
6 percent of  the population of  U.S.  manufacturing establishments in  1977 
(350,648 establishments), but it accounts for about 55 percent of  total US. 
manufacturing employment in that year. Thus the establishments in the Lich- 
tenberg and Siegel data set are very large. Specifically, 82 percent of the plants 
in this sample employ at least 250 workers, 28.8 percent employ between 250 
and 499 workers, and 52.7 percent employ more than 500. The average number 
of workers per establishment is 501, almost 10 times as large as the population 
average (5  3 workers). 
Lichtenberg and Siegel identify ownership changes using only CC codes 
(Lichtenberg and Siegel 1992a, 31). They do not take our last step of trying to 
identify ownership changes not indicated by CC codes.9  However, their proce- 
dure probably presents few problems for accurately tracking ownership change 
of the plants included in their sample because they use only the balanced panel 
that contains the largest establishments in the LRD. These plants are generally 
included in the ASM  and have CC codes. On the other hand, because their 
sample excludes all plants (both small and large) that entered or exited manu- 
facturing after  1972, Lichtenberg and  Siegel miss a significant number of 
plants entering manufacturing and changing owners after 1972 and those that 
had  ownership change during 1972-80  and exited by  or before 1981.’O For 
the period 1972-81, they identify about 4,300 manufacturing plants changing 
ownership (21 percent of their sample of 20,500 continuous plants). In prelimi- 
nary work for the entire manufacturing sector, McGuckin and Nguyen find 
7,414 plants with at least one change during the period  1972-77  and 12,289 
plants changing owners during 1977-82. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel’s data set has several disadvantages. First, because 
8. Recall that section 6.3.1 indicates that the 1977-82  selling firms sold 1,573 food plants and 
538 nonfood plants. 
9. For their study of employment in auxiliary establishments, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992a, 
31-32)  assume that ownership changes if and only if the ID of the auxiliary establishment changes. 
They recognize that “this procedure is subject to errors: Some nonmatches of the code may be due 
to coding errors, and certain ownership changes may not result in changes in the code” (Lichten- 
berg and Siegel 1992b, 49). 
10. The ending date, 198  1,  of the Lichtenberg-Siege1 sample period is unfortunate because it is 
just before the 1982 Census of Manufactures. This means that extensive revisions in the Census 
Bureau data files undertaken in preparation for each economic census were not available to help 
identify ownership change. This increases the possibility of mistakes in identifying ownership 
change. On the other hand, restriction of the sample to large plants, while raising selection bias 
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their balanced panel contains only large, surviving plants, it is not representa- 
tive of the entire distribution of plants. In fact, it excludes most acquisitions 
from consideration. Second, their  sample requires continuous plants and, 
hence, excludes plants entering manufacturing after 1972 and subsequently 
acquired. Finally, their sample excludes closed plants, including plants ac- 
quired between 1973 and 1980 and closed by or before 1981. 
Brown and Medoff (1988) use data on the employment and wages of firms 
in Michigan compiled from unemployment insurance (ES-202) records kept 
by  the Michigan Employment Security Commission (MESC). The research 
database, constructed at the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan, covers over 200,000 firms located in the state of Michigan during 
the period 1978:3-1984:4,  is described in Brown et al. (1990). The basic docu- 
mentation is in Connor et al. (1984). 
The MESC database contains data on all Michigan employers that are re- 
quired to pay unemployment insurance taxes (“liable employers”). The MESC 
system assigns a six-digit unemployment insurance number to each firm. (The 
MESC data system also includes the EIN-so  there is a link between the EIN 
and  the  unemployment insurance number-but  the  research  file used  by 
Brown  and  Medoff  does not  include the  EIN.)  MESC tracks  ownership 
changes that affect the set of liable employers. In general, liable employers are 
those that had employees in each of a set of different weeks in a calendar year, 
had persons covered by unemployment insurance on their payrolls, or acquired 
another liable employer.” A business can acquire another business through 
“sale, foreclosure, lease, bankruptcy, or merger” (MESC 1995, 7). The new 
owner is known as the successor, and the process of acquiring an existing busi- 
ness is called successorship.12 
The MESC data set allows Brown and Medoff (1988) to define three types 
of acquisitions: (1) “simple sales,” (2) “asset-only sales,” and (3) “mergers.” 
They also define “reorganizations,” which look like simple sales except that 
the type of business changes. Brown and Medoff recognize the difficulty in 
distinguishing between reorganizations and simple sales. 
This data set contains firm-level data, in contrast to the plant-level data in 
the LRD. The MESC has two advantages over the LRD (used in Lichtenberg 
and Siege1 study and ours): it is not limited to the manufacturing sector, and it 
has relatively complete coverage of  firm activity within Michigan (at least 
11. As of  1995, “generally, a liable employer is an employing unit that either (1) employed one 
or more employees in each of any 20 different weeks in a calendar year. . . ;  or (2) paid $1,OOO or 
more in payroll in a calendar year to employees covered by  unemployment insurance: or (3) ac- 
quired the trade, organization (i.e., all employees), or business, or at least 75 percent of the assets 
of  a liable employer” (MESC 1995,2).  There are different requirements for employers of agricul- 
tural or domestic workers. 
12. As of  1995, “if a new or existing business acquires 75 percent or more of  the assets of 
another business, and within 12  months either continues the previous or a similar business, or uses 
the trade name or good will of the previous business, then there is a mandatory transfer of  the 
unemployment tax experience, or history, of the previous business” (MESC 1995,7). 221  Measuring the Impact of Ownership Change on Labor 
firms covered by unemployment insurance). However, the MESC data set ex- 
hibits certain weaknesses in identifying ownership changes. A major weak- 
ness-not  shared by  the LRD-stems  from its coverage of  only one state. 
Mergers between a Michigan firm and an out-of-state firm will look like a 
simple sale because there is no record of  the out-of-state firm in the MESC 
data set. Also, when a Michigan firm acquires an out-of-state firm, there is no 
record of  the acquisition at all (Brown and Medoff 1988, 12). “For instance, 
General Motors’ acquisition of EDS and Hughes Aircraft would probably not 
be recorded in their data” (Carliner 1988,27). Farber observed that “the central 
limitation of the data is that it deals explicitly with employment in Michigan. 
In particular, many firms have business . . . operations that span state bound- 
aries, so that looking strictly at Michigan employment is likely to give a mis- 
leading picture of both the employment size distribution of firms involved in 
mergers and acquisitions and the employment effects of mergers and acquisi- 
tion” (1988, 28-29). 
Compared to Brown and Medoff‘s and Lichtenberg and Siegel’s data sets, 
our sample has several advantages. First, our data cover the entire population 
of  the food-manufacturing industry and includes all small, medium-size, and 
large establishments located anywhere in the United States. Second, our unbal- 
anced panel includes both entering and exiting plants. This allows us to more 
accurately measure ownership change activities and hence the effects of own- 
ership change on  labor. Finally, our decomposition of  individual firms into 
separate components (own plant, closed plant, and acquired plant, etc.) allows 
us to take a close look at individual components of the firm before and after 
ownership change. 
While our data set has advantages, it also has several shortcomings. First, it 
includes only one two-digit SIC industry. Therefore, it is not representative of 
the entire U.S. manufacturing sector. Second, it does not contain data for cen- 
tral offices. This prevents us from examining the effect of  ownership change 
on control management operations. Finally, as with the other two data sets, 
ours does not contain information on types of merger, for example, whether a 
takeover is hostile or friendly. 
6.3.3  IJnit of Analysis: Firm versus Plant 
An  important issue in studying the impact of  ownership change on firms’ 
activities is: What is the appropriate unit of analysis? Is the “firm” or “plant” 
the right unit of  analysis? Because acquisition is part of a strategy to realign 
resources and operations of the firm-a  strategy that may encompass acquisi- 
tion, divestiture, and internal growth-the  composition effects associated with 
the nature and timing of  the transaction may  be important in assessing the 
impact of  particular transactions. Indeed, the components of a firm can and do 
change over time. In particular, the mix of plants of an acquiring firm before 
and after merger can differ substantially. Before merger, the firm owns a set of 
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the firm. After merger, the structure of the firm may look much different from 
before: it now includes acquired plants and plants that are newly built in addi- 
tion to its surviving own plants. Thus simply looking at the performance (e.g., 
employment, wage, and productivity growth) of the whole firm before and after 
merger may not be appropriate. A related issue involves the empirical flexibil- 
ity and richness of models based on plant-level data. 
For example, in their conclusions, Brown and Medoff point out that “the 
estimated effects of mergers are also subject to a composition effect. If  the 
(relatively highly paid) head of the acquired firm leaves following the merger, 
average wages will fall. Given the small size of our typical firm, a nontrivial 
share of our estimated wage decline from merger may be due to such composi- 
tion effects” (1988, 23). Lichtenberg and Siegel’s results based on plant-level 
data provide strong evidence on this composition effect: ownership changes 
have a significant, negative effect on both employment and wage growth in 
central offices and little effect in production plants. The advantages of plant 
data are discussed further in McGuckin (1995). 
6.3.4  Variable Measurement 
tivity. 
Employment and Wage Variables 
Employment is measured by the total number of employees, which comprise 
production workers and nonproduction workers. Wages are defined as workers’ 
annual salaries. We note that this measure of wages does not include nonwage 
costs associated with labor because separate data on these costs are not avail- 
able for the two types of workers. In addition, Dunne and Roberts find that 
“non-wage costs are a poorly reported variable in the census data . .  .  many of 
the plants have this variable imputed” (1993,7). Following Dunne and Roberts, 
we do not include nonwage costs in the wage measure used here. This is a 
potentially important measurement problem since the form of compensation 
can vary across firms and industries. Real wages are defined as nominal wages 
deflated by the consumer price index taken from the Survey of  Current Busi- 
ness (September 1993). 
Productivity Measurement 
We  use value of  shipments as our measure of  output in the productivity 
measure. Data on value added are not always available, particularly for small 
plants. In practice, productivity results using either measure are highly corre- 
lated. For example, the results in McGuckin and Nguyen (1994), which also 
use food industry data over this period, are unaffected by the choice of value 
added or shipments. (See also Baily et al. 1992; Baily et al. 1994.) 
Productivity can be measured either for each single input such as labor (la- 
bor productivity, LP) or for all inputs (total factor productivity,  TFP).  Theoreti- 
cally, TFP is the appropriate measure of productivity because it takes into ac- 
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count all inputs. In practice, LP is often used because data on inputs, such as 
capital, that are required for the measurement of  TFP are not available. Be- 
cause of data limitations, we base our analysis on LP.I3 
Plant LP is measured as value of shipments in current dollars divided by the 
total number of employees. While output prices and value of shipments vary 
across plants and over time because of price dispersion and inflation, deflating 
each plant’s LP by  its industry average LP produces a comparable productivity 
measure through time.I4  We  call this adjusted LP measure relative labor pro- 
ductivity (RLP).I5 
Plant RLP provides a good measure of plant performance if all plants in the 
same industry have  similar input-output ratios. If  the production technology 
differs substantially among plants, RLP  could be a misleading measure of per- 
formance. However, in our earlier work (McGuckin and Nguyen 1994), we 
estimate TFP for a number of large plants for which the required data are avail- 
able. We  then compare the TFP results to the RLP results and find that both 
measures lead to the same conclusions regarding plant performance. 
While single-unit firms are classified in a single industry, multiunit firms 
often have plants operating in various industries. For multiunit firms, we calcu- 
late the productivity for each plant separately then obtain the firm productivity 
as a weighted sum of  plant productivities. Thus we measure the RLP of the 
firm by 
RLPF  = c  WkjRLP,,, 
J 
where RLP!  is RLP of firm k, the weight wk,  is the ratio of plantj’s employment 
to the total number of employees of firm k, and the summation is over the n 
plants of firm k. 
6.4  Descriptive Statistics 
6.4.1  Firm-Level Data 
Table 6.3 presents 1977 and 1987 wages, productivity, and total employment 
for all firms operating in the food industry during the period under study. Since 
we only observe the manufacturing operations of each firm, we classify acquir- 
ing firms into four groups: (1) single-unit firms, (2) multiunit nonmanufactur- 
ing firms entering manufacturing by buying one food plant, (3) multiunit non- 
manufacturing firms entering manufacturing by  buying more than one food 
13. McGuckin and Nguyen (1994) estimate both RLP  and TF’P using data for 3,800 continuous 
plants in the food industry. They then use these two productivity estimates in their regression 
analysis of ownership change and find that the two measures yield very similar results. They note, 
however, that the results based on data for continuous plants are subject to serious sample selec- 
tion bias. 
14. Industry is defined at the four-digit level throughout the paper. 
15. For further justification on its use, see McGuckin  and Nguyen (1994) and Christensen, 




Size  No. of Finns  Wage Rate  Total Employment  1977 RJP 
1977  1987  1977  1987  1977  1987  1977  1987  1977  1987 
Acquiring jnns  1977-82 
1. Single unit 
Surviving by  1987 
Sold by  1987 
Exit by  1987 
Subtotal 
2. Nonmanufacturing, one food plant 
Surviving by  1987 
Sold by  1987 
Exit by  1987 
Subtotal 
one food plant 
Surviving by  1987 
Sold by  1987 
Exit by  1987 
Subtotal 
























































































































1.07 4. Multiunit manufacturing 
Surviving by  1987 
Sold by  1987 
Exit by  1987 
Subtotal 
Nonacquiring  firms 1  977-82b 
1. Single unit 
Surviving by  1987 
Sold by  1987 
Exit by  1987 
Subtotal 
2. Nonmanufacturing, one food plant 
Surviving by  1987 
Sold by  1987 
Exit by  1987 
Subtotal 
3. Multiunit manufacturing' 
Surviving by  1987 
Sold by  1987 
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plant, and (4) multiunit manufacturing acquiring firms. Using the same frame- 
work gives three groups for nonacquiring firms: (1) single-unit firms, (2) non- 
manufacturing multiunit firms having only one plant operating in  the food- 
manufacturing industry, and (3) multiunit manufacturing firms having at least 
one plant operating in the food-manufacturing  industry. 
While we report data by each grouping of firms, we focus our discussion on 
multiunit manufacturing firms because they account for most economic activ- 
ity in the food industry, regardless of  how economic activity is defined. For 
example, in both 1977 and 1987, multiunit manufacturing acquirers accounted 
for more than 91 percent of the total number of workers employed by all firms 
that acquired at least one food plant. Multiunit manufacturing firms also ac- 
counted for large fractions of total nonacquiring firm output, 77.6 and 80.0 
percent in 1977 and 1987, respectively. 
Table 6.3 shows a striking difference in employment growth between acquir- 
ing and nonacquiring surviving firms. The average size of multiunit manufac- 
turing acquiring firms increased by  37.3 percent (from 3,649 employees in 
1977 to 5,011 employees in 1987), whereas the average size of nonacquiring 
multiunit manufacturing firms declined by 7.6 percent during the same period 
(from 1,570 in 1977 to 1,451 employees in 1987). By 1987 the 268 surviving 
multiunit acquiring firms employed in total 1,343,05  1 workers, approximately 
12 percent more than the total employment of the 1977  cohort of 355 acquiring 
firms (1,202,734 workers) and 37.3 percent more than the 977,878 workers 
they employed in 1977. In contrast, by  1987 the 667 surviving  multiunit nonac- 
quiring firms employed 967,793 workers, a 7.6 percent decline from their 1977 
employment level and well below the 1,252,848  workers employed by the 1977 
cohort of  1,157 firms that did not change owners during 1977-82. 
Turning to wages, we find that, on average, multiunit firms paid the highest 
wages. Multiunit acquiring firms paid average wages of $22,439 (in 1987 dol- 
lars) per year in 1977 and $23,360 per year in 1987, a 3.6 percent increase in 
real wages. Multiunit nonacquiring firms paid average wages of $20,940 per 
year in 1977 and $22,203 in 1987, a 5.7 percent increase. 
Regarding productivity, we find that firms having the highest initial produc- 
tivity survived, while those with the lowest closed. Acquired firms had above 
average levels of productivity, but their productivity levels were well below 
those of surviving firms and above those of closed firms. Acquiring firms had 
higher productivity levels than nonacquiring firms in both 1977 and 1987. The 
1977 and  1987 productivities of acquiring firms were  1.14 and  1.08, while 
those of nonacquiring firms were 1.00 and 1.02, respectively. Thus, although 
acquiring firms showed higher productivity levels at both the beginning and 
end of the 1977-87  period, they experienced a 56 percent decline in relative 
productivity over the period, while nonacquiring firms showed modest produc- 
tivity improvement (2.0 percent). 
Unfortunately, it is not clear from these results exactly how acquisition af- 
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shows that acquiring firms increased their employment substantially during the 
1977-87  period, but it is not clear whether this increase came from upsizing 
existing plants or acquired plants or simply from opening new  plants. In  a 
similar vein, the decline in productivity of acquiring firms could come from 
the diminishing productivity of old existing plants or acquisition of plants with 
productivity levels below those already a part of  the firm, or it could come 
from a decline in  productivity of  acquired plants. It is imperative to turn to 
plant-level data and examine the performance of the different components of 
the firm to isolate the impacts of acquisition on observed firm-level results. 
6.4.2  Plant-Level Data 
Table 6.4 reports productivity, total employment, and wages for individual 
components of both acquiring and nonacquiring firms in  1977 and 1987. Col- 
umns (1  ) and (2) show that, except for plants purchased during 1983-87  by 
firms acquiring in both the 1977-82  and 1983-87  periods, all groups of  pur- 
chased plants show improvement in relative productivity by  1987. Specifically, 
plants purchased during  1977-82  and kept by  acquiring firms through  1987 
increased their productivity by  4 percent (from 1.02 in 1977 to 1.06 in 1987). 
Plants purchased by  (1977-82)  nonacquirers during  1983-87  also increased 
their productivity by  2 percent (from 0.95 in 1977 to 0.97 in 1987). 
In contrast, the relative productivity of plants initially owned and kept until 
1987 by both acquirers and nonacquirers declined noticeably: a 6 percent de- 
cline for plants owned by acquirers (from 1.18 in 1977 to 1.  ll in 1987) and a 
5 percent decline for plants owned by nonacquirers (from 1.04 in 1977 to 0.99 
in  1987). New  plants opened by  both acquirers and nonacquirers had  1987 
productivity levels well above those of existing and purchased plants. 
These results suggest two major sources for the observed decrease in the 
relative productivity of  acquiring firms. The first is the decline in the relative 
efficiency of older plants initially owned by the acquiring firms. The second is 
the lower productivity of  the plants purchased by  acquirers: while acquired 
plants experienced a noticeable improvement in productivity, their 1987 pro- 
ductivity levels were still below those of old (1977 kept plants) and new plants. 
Inclusion of  these “below average” plants lowers the average productivity of 
the firm. 
New plants built by both acquirers and nonacquirers had the highest levels 
of productivity. For nonacquirers, these high-productivity new plants offset the 
decline in the relative efficiency of their older plants. However, in the case of 
acquiring firms, the high productivity of new plants could not compensate for 
the relative efficiency decline because acquired plants had lower levels of pro- 
ductivity than previously owned plants. Thus, even though acquired plants had 
above industry average productivity prior to acquisition and became more pro- 
ductive  after  acquisition, the  firm-level  relative  productivity of  acquiring 
firms fell. 
Turning to employment, columns (3) and (4) show that both acquiring and Table 6.4  Productivity, Employment, and  Wages of Acquiring and Nonacquiring 
Multiunit Manufacturing Firms  and Component Parts, 1977 and 1987 
(simple means) 
~~  ____ 
Relative 
Productivity  Total Employment  Real Wage Rates 
1977  1987  1977  1987  1977  1987 
Firm or Component  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Acquiringjrms 1977-82' 
Surviving to 1987 
Sold by  1987 
Exit by  1987 
All firms 
Components of surviving 
acquiring firms 
Plants owned in 1977 
Kept in 1987 
Sold by 1987 
Exit by 1987 
All plants 
Kept in 1987 
Sold by 1987 
Exit by 1987 
All plants 
New plants 1977-82 
New plants 1983-87 
Plants acquired 1983-87 
Nonacquiring  firms 1977-8Zab 
Surviving to 1987 
Sold by  1987 
Exit by  1987 
All firms 
Components of surviving 
nonacquiring firms 
Plants owned in 1977 
Kept in 1987 
Sold by 1987 
Exit by 1987 
All plants 
New plants 1978-82 
New plants 1983-87 
Plants acquired 1983-87 
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nonacquiring firms were very active in restructuring themselves. Each sold and 
built new plants and closed old plants. However, only acquirers also bought 
plants. Acquiring firms increased their employment, while nonacquiring firms 
showed decreases. The reason for this difference is that acquiring firms in- 
creased their employment by  acquiring and building plants more than they 
decreased their employment by closing and selling plants. In contrast, nonac- 
quiring firms closed and sold more plants than they built. 
One of the reasons that the surviving acquiring firms show good job perfor- 
mance is that they include the employment of sold firms that they acquire. As 
shown in table 6.4, this source of growth for acquiring firms is substantial. But 
even taking this source of employment into account does not alter the conclu- 
sion that ownership change is associated with employment increases. Unlike 
acquirers that hired more workers for their existing plants, nonacquiring firms 
cut employment in their existing plants. Taken together, the net employment 
gain for plants purchased by  acquirers during  1977-87  was  16,238 workers 
(from 602,977 workers in  1977 to 619,215 workers in 1987). 
Finally, columns (5) and (6) report  on  annual  wages.  In  general, plants 
owned by acquiring firms paid higher wages than those owned by nonacquiring 
firms. This is expected because, on average, acquirers’ plants were bigger and 
more productive than nonacquirers’ plants. Nonetheless,  the differences be- 
tween acquiring and nonacquiring firms are not large in either 1977 or 1987. 
While both surviving acquiring and nonacquiring firms show increases in real 
wages in all their components, the observed increases range from 2 to 7 percent 
over the 10-year interval. 
These statistics suggest that ownership change had positive effects on both 
employment and productivity growth during the period under study. For wages, 
the difference  in  performance appears much  smaller. However, conclusions 
based on simple averages like these can only be tentative because they do not 
control for the effects of factors other than ownership change. Among other 
things,  such factors include the firm’s size, technology, and the industry  in 
which the firm operates. For this reason, we turn to a regression analysis. This 
allows us to assess the impact of ownership change on employment, wages, 
and productivity while controlling for possible effects of other factors. It also 
helps to clarify the important differences  in experimental design associated 
with use of firm or plant as the unit of analysis. 
6.5  Regression Analysis 
In this section, we use the detailed microdata described above to estimate 
the effects of ownership change on employment, wage, and labor productivity 
growth. To control for the effects of factors other than ownership change, we 
estimate reduced-form regressions in which the growth rates of employment, 
wages, and productivity are the dependent variables. Ownership change and 
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form probit  regressions  designed to  assess the  likelihood that  ownership 
change is associated with plant closures. We  note that most variables in our 
models are likely to be  determined jointly, and without a structural model, 
including good instrumental variables, we are limited in what we can say about 
causality. Nonetheless, we think this exercise is an instructive first step in un- 
derstanding the role of ownership change in labor markets. 
We specify our wage and employment equations as 
In X,, - In X,,  = a,  + a,OC,,,,  + a, In W,,  + a3  In E,, 
+ a, ATECH  + a,,OC,,,,  * In E,, , 
where In is natural logarithm;  X denotes total employment (number of workers, 
E) or wages (Wage); OC is a dummy variable (OC = 1 if  the firm or plant 
experienced ownership change; otherwise OC  = 0);  and ATECH denotes 
change in technology of the firm or plant. The ratio of machinery and equip- 
ment to capital stock provides a proxy for the level of technology of the firm- 
we assume that given the same level of capital stock, the firm that uses more 
equipment and machinery is more technologically advanced. This variable may 
also be viewed as an adjustment to account for the fact that, other things equal, 
labor productivities will be higher in capital-intensive  plants. 
The above wage and employment equations are similar to those used by 
Brown and Medoff (1988) and Lichtenberg and Siege1 (1992b). They reflect 
specifications  used in the literature analyzing the impact of training on work- 
ers’ earnings and employment. The basic idea underlying the equations is to 
ask whether changes in ownership had significant effects on employment and 
wages controlling for initial conditions (i.e., initial employment and wages). 
Our specifications differ in that we also include the variable ATECH and an 
interaction term, OC,,,,  * In  E,,,  to allow for interactions between OC and 
(employment) size. We  do this because our data reveal that large firms (or 
plants) behave differently from small ones. 
Similarly, our productivity change equation is specified as 
In RLP,,  - In RLP7, = b,  + b,OC,,,,  + 6,  In  + b,  In  E,, 
(3)  + b,ATECH  + a,30C77.82  * In  E,, 
+ a;, In  UP7,  * In E,, , 
where RLP  denotes relative labor productivity. Other variables are defined as 
above. 
The regression analysis outlined so far is based on surviving plants: each 
equation relates ownership change to changes in productivity, wages, and em- 
ployment that are estimated using data on surviving plants. Thus it is important 
to address the issue of plant closing or exiting after ownership change. To do 
so, we run probit regressions in  which plant closing (PC) is the dependent 
variable. Ownership change (OC) is specified as an explanatory variable. We 231  Measuring the Impact of Ownership Change on Labor 
include initial relative productivity (RLP,,)  and employment (E,,)  as control 
variables. For comparisons, we also include the variable OWNPLT,,,,  which 
identifies whether the plant was originally owned by an acquiring firm in 1977 
(the omitted category is plants that were owed by nonacquiring firms in 1977). 
Finally, we allow for nonlinear effects of initial productivity and employment 
size on plant closure. Our probit regression is 
(4) 
PC,,  = a, + a,0C7,.,,  + a,OWNPLT,,  + a,RLP,,  + a,, In E,, 
+  u13°c77-87  * RLp77  + u14°c77-87  * In  E77 
+ a2,0WNPLTm, * In  E,,  + u,,(RLP,,)~ 
+ u,(ln  E,,)?  + q4RLP7,  * In E,, , 
where PC,,  equals one if the plant was closed by  1987 (zero otherwise), OC,,,, 
equals one if  the plant changed ownership during 1977-87  (zero otherwise), 
and OWNPLT,,,  equals one if the plant was owned by  an acquiring firm in 
1977 (zero otherwise). The remaining variables are defined as before. 
Before proceeding, we note that RLP,,,  E,,, and W,, may reflect “transitory” 
rather than “initial” conditions of  plants acquired during  1977-82.  A better 
approach is to use data on these variables for several years before the plant is 
acquired to describe its initial condition. However, doing so requires continu- 
ous data, which in turn significantly reduces our sample size. Estimates based 
on such a truncated sample could lead to serious sample selection bias. Never- 
theless, in preliminary work using data for the entire US.  manufacturing sec- 
tor, use of average values of  1972 and 1977 data as a proxies for initial condi- 
tions of acquired plants (e.g., initial RLP = (RLP,,  + RLP,,)/2)  shows results 
very similar to those using 1977 values alone. 
6.6  Regression Results 
6.6.1  Firm-Level Results 
Table 6.5 reports the firm-level results for the wage, employment, and pro- 
ductivity equations.I6 In each equation, the variable ACQUIRER equals one if 
the firm is an acquiring firm. FOOD is a zero-one dummy variable having a 
value of one if the firm is a primary food-producing firm. The variable 5. is the 
residual estimated from the productivity equation (3). This variable is included 
in the wage equation to capture the possible effect of productivity on wages. 
We use 5. instead of the explicit productivity variable to avoid a potential simul- 
taneity problem. Inclusion of  5,  FOOD, and ATECH does not significantly 
affect the estimated coefficients of  the key variable ACQUIRER. 
16. In our preliminary work, we estimated various competing models for each equation. Here 
we report only the results of two models for each equation because other models yield very sirni- 
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Table 6.5  Firm-Level Regressions 
Wage Equation  Employment Equation  Productivity Equation 
Independent  ModelI  ModelII  ModelI  ModelII  ModelI  ModelII 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept  1.094* 
ACQUIRER  -  .082 
'n El,  046' 
In  Wl,  -.384* 





In E,,*ACQUIRER  .010 
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Notes: Dependent variables of the wage, employment, and productivity equations are In W,, -  In W,,,  In 
E,, -  In E77,  and In RLP,, -  In RLP,,,  respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
+Significant at the 5 percent level. 
For the wage equation (cols. [l]  and  [2]),  the ACQUIRER coefficient is 
about -0.08  and that for the interaction term, In  E,,  * ACQUIRER, is 0.01. 
These estimates imply that the wage growth of  a typical acquiring firm-a 
firm with average (log) employment of 5.65-is  about 2.5 percent higher than 
that of a typical nonacquiring firm, but the result is not statistically significant. 
This estimate is consistent with the Brown and Medoff (1988) firm-level find- 
ing that the impact of acquisition on wages is small. 
Columns (3) and  (4)  present estimated coefficients for the employment 
equations. The coefficient for ACQUIRER is 0.166  and  that for In  E7, * 
ACQUIRER is 0.068 (col. [4]),  indicating that, on average, the employment 
growth of  acquiring firms is about 55.2 percent (= 0.166  + 0.068(5.65)) 
higher than that of nonacquiring firms. While this estimate is not statistically 
significant, it appears to be economically significant. Acquiring firms do not 
appear to reduce their workforces. 233  Measuring the Impact of Ownership Change on Labor 
Finally, columns (5) and (6) show estimated coefficients for the productivity 
growth equations. The estimated coefficient for the ACQUIRER variable is 
about -0,200  and that for In E,, * ACQUIRER is 0.006. These estimates imply 
labor productivity growth for an average acquiring firm about  16.5 percent 
lower than that for an average nonacquiring firm. While economically signifi- 
cant, the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. The negative co- 
efficients for ACQUIRER are consistent with the figures reported in table 6.3 
showing that the average relative labor productivity of  multiunit acquiring 
firms declined from 1.14 in 1977 to 1.08 in 1987, while that of multiunit nonac- 
quiring firms increased from 0.97 to  1.02. More generally, these results are 
consistent with many  studies of  mergers and acquisitions that suggest there 
has been little gain to acquiring firms after merger (see, e.g., Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1987). Before drawing any conclusions we turn to analysis with the 
plant-level data. The figures in  table 6.4 show vastly different performance 
among the various components of both acquiring and nonacquiring firms. The 
plant-level data allow us to directly model these differences and to isolate the 
effects of ownership change on the performance of acquiring firms. 
6.6.2  Plant-Level Results 
Wage Change Equation 
Table  6.6 reports the coefficients for the wage equations estimated using 
plant-level data.I7  The variable OC has a value of one if a plant had ownership 
change in either the 1977-82  or the 1983-87  period. In addition, we introduce 
two variables: OC,,,,  equals one if  a plant had ownership change between 
1977 and 1982 and zero otherwise, and OC,,,,  equals one if it was purchased 
between  1982 and  1987 and zero otherwise. This specification allows us  to 
isolate the impacts in each subperiod of the 1972-87 period. In the plant-level 
specifications, we  also introduce a new variable, OWNPLT,,,  which equals 
one if a plant is initially owned by  an  acquiring firm in  1977 and operates 
through 1987 and zero otherwise. The omitted category is nonacquiring firms’ 
own plants. Other variables are defined as before. Models 11,  IV, and VI use 
four-digit industry dummies as control variables, while models I, 111,  and V 
do not.I8 
Columns (1) and (2) of table 6.6 show estimated coefficients for the linear 
wage equation model. The coefficient for the OC variable is negative and insig- 
nificant (model I). It is only marginally significant when four-digit industry 
dummies are incorporated into the model (model 11). With the nonlinear mod- 
els (models 111 and IV), the coefficient for OC is positive and highly significant 
and that for In E,, * OC is significantly negative. The significance of the inter- 
17. Inclusion of  non-food-manufacturing plants owned by food-manufacturing firms does not 
18. Because  the  dependent variables are  in growth rates, the  sample used in this regression 
alter the results. 
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Table 6.6  Wage Change Equation: Food Plant Data 
Independent  Model1  ModelII  Modelm  ModelIV  ModelV  ModelVI 



































































































































Nores: Dependent variable is In W,,  -  In  W7?.  Numbers in parentheses are f-ratios. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
+Significant at the 5 percent level. 
action term indicates that a nonlinear model is more appropriate than a linear 
model. 
Models I11 and IV indicate that the wages of  smaller plants increase more 
quickly if they have  an ownership change. But larger plants increase wages 
faster if they do not undergo ownership change. More specifically,  the estimate 
of 0.387 for OC and -0.089  for In  E,7 * OC (with the mean of  In E77 equal to 
3.00) implies that a typical acquired plant increased its workers' wages 12 per- 
cent (= 0.387 -  0.089(3)) faster than a plant owned by a nonacquiring firm.I9 
19. The exact size at which performance of nonacquirers exceeds acquirers is sensitive to the 
sample of plants and model specification. Nonetheless, the size cutoff is always well above the 
third quantile of the employment size distribution and usually falls in the top 10 to 20 percentiles. 235  Measuring the Impact of  Ownership Change on Labor 
While for many questions the behavior of a typical plant is a key issue, for 
many others the effect on a typical worker is of interest. We assess the latter 
using the (employment size) weighted average of the estimated effect of own- 
ership change on the dependent variable (wage growth). We find this weighted 
average effect is positive, indicating that the wage growth of a typical worker 
in acquiring firms is 1.4 percent higher than that of a typical worker in nonac- 
quiring firms. This figure is much smaller than that found for the typical ac- 
quired plant because a typical worker is more likely to work in a large plant 
than in a small plant. Thus the slower growth in wages at large plants affects 
more workers. Nevertheless, using either the unweighted or weighted figure, 
ownership change has a positive effect on wages. 
A key question is whether this gain in wages for workers in acquired plants 
is achieved at the expense of workers in other plants of the firm. Columns (5) 
and (6) show estimates for models V and VI, which classify acquiring firms’ 
plants into three groups: plants acquired between  1977 and  1982 (OC77.,2), 
plants acquired between 1982 and 1987 (OCg2.,,),  and acquiring firms’ surviv- 
ing plants (OWNPLT,,).  The coefficients for OC,,,,  and OC,,,,  are signifi- 
cantly positive, and the corresponding interaction terms are significantly nega- 
tive. This is in accord with the estimate of ownership change discussed above: 
except for a subset of  large plants, plants having ownership change tend to 
increase wages more quickly than plants that do not change ownership. Using 
the coefficients of model VI  (col. [6]) and keeping employment fixed at the 
mean  plant  size, we  find that  typical  plants  acquired  during  1977-82  and 
1982-87  outperformed the corresponding nonacquiring firms’ plants in terms 
of wage growth by 9.2 and 15.3 percent, respectively. The corresponding (em- 
ployment) weighted figures are -2.2  percent and 2.9 percent, indicating that 
typical workers in plants acquired during 1977-82  were worse off, while typi- 
cal workers in plants acquired during 1982-87  were better off, compared with 
workers in plants owned by nonacquiring firms. 
Turning to the workers in acquiring firms’ plants owned prior to acquisition, 
we estimate the coefficients for OWNPLT,,  and In E77 * OWNPLT,,  as 0.278 
and -0.063,  respectively. These coefficients indicate that wage growth in ac- 
quiring firms’ own plants is about 9 percent higher than in plants of nonacquir- 
ing firms. The corresponding employment-weighted figure is 5.5 percent. Thus 
a typical worker in an acquiring firm’s own plant also experiences wage gains 
relative to a typical worker in a nonacquiring firm. 
Employment Change Equation 
Columns (1) and (2) of table 6.7 report estimated coefficients for the linear 
employment models, while the remaining columns show estimated coefficients 
for nonlinear models. The estimated  coefficients for OC in both linear and 
nonlinear models are significantly positive, indicating that acquired plants’ em- 
ployment grew faster than that of nonacquired plants. Using the estimates from 
model IV and fixing employment at mean plant size, we find that, on average, 
acquired plants increased employment faster than nonacquiring firms’ plants 236  Robert H. McGuckin, Sang V.  Nguyen, and Arnold P. Reznek 
Table 6.7  Employment Change Equation: Food Plant Data 
Independent  Model I  Model I1  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI 
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Notes:  Dependent variable is In EE7 -  In E77.  Numbers in parentheses are r-ratios. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
by  16.1 percent (i.e., 0.239 -  0.026(3) = 0.161). The employment-weighted 
figure is 13.0 percent. 
When we split the OC variable into two variables, OC,,.,,  and OC,,.,,,  the 
estimated coefficient for OC,,,,  is 0.033 and that for In E,, * OC,,.,,  is 0.029, 
indicating that growth in a typical plant acquired between 1977 and  1982 is 
about 12 percent higher than that in a nonacquiring firm’s plant. Weighting the 
estimates by  employment, we  find this effect to be even higher, about 15.5 
percent. Note that, although these figures appear to be economically signifi- 
cant, they are not statistically significant. For the 1982-87  period, the esti- 
mated coefficients for OC,,,,  and In E,, * OCSz.,, are 0.357 and -0.038.  Both 
are statistically significant. These estimates imply that a typical plant acquired 
during 1982-87  had an employment growth rate about 24 percent higher than 237  Measuring the Impact of Ownership Change on Labor 
that of a typical plant of a nonacquiring firm. The employment-weighted effect 
is about 20 percent. 
Finally, the coefficient for OWNPLT,,  is -0.004  and is not statistically sig- 
nificant, while that for In E,, * OWNPLT,,  is 0.033 and is significant at the 5 
percent level. These coefficients imply that a typical previously owned plant 
of an acquiring firm had an employment growth rate 9.5 percent higher than 
that of  a typical plant of  a nonacquiring  firm. The weighted  figure is even 
higher at  13.5 percent. These estimates suggest that the increase in employ- 
ment at acquired plants did not come at the expense of workers in existing 
plants. 
Productivity Change Equations 
Table 6.8 reports results for the productivity equation. The coefficient for 
OC is negative in the linear models (cols. [l]  and [2]). It, however, becomes 
significantly positive in the nonlinear models (cols. [3]-[6]).  The coefficient 
for In E,,  * OC is also significant in the nonlinear models. Columns (5)  and 
(6) show that the coefficients for OC,,.,,  are significantly positive, indicating 
that productivity grew faster for plants acquired during 1977-82  than for non- 
acquiring firms’ plants. This result holds whether or not four-digit dummies 
are incorporated in the regressions. The coefficients for OC,,,,  are negative 
and insignificant, indicating that plants changing ownership just before  1987 
did not perform better than nonacquiring firms’ plants. These results are con- 
sistent with the data, reported earlier in table 6.4, that showed that the produc- 
tivity of plants purchased during 1977-82  grew 4.0 percent (from 1.02 in 1977 
to  1.06 in  1987), while the productivity of  plants acquired during  1982-87 
declined by 3.0 percent (from 1.01 in  1977 to 0.98 in 1987). One explanation 
for this is that it takes some time for acquiring firms to integrate purchased 
plants into their operations. For this reason, and because preliminary work with 
other industries suggests the positive effect is robust, we give more credence 
to the results for ownership changes for the 1977-82  period. 
Using the estimates of model VI and fixing employment at mean plant size, 
we find that productivity for a typical plant acquired during  1977-82  grew 
faster than that for a plant owned by a nonacquiring firm (by 16.2 percent be., 
0.459 -  0.099(3) = 0.1621). This advantage for acquired plants diminishes as 
plant size increases. To be exact, when In E = 4.64 (i.e., 0.459/0.099 = 4.64, 
the eightieth percentile value of the sample) the productivity of both types of 
plants grew at the same rate. Beyond this size-about  twice the average size 
in our sample-the  productivity of acquiring firms’ plants grew more slowly 
than for nonacquired plants. The weighted estimates suggest that the plants 
acquired during  1977-82  had a 4.4 percent higher productivity  growth rate 
than nonacquired plants. 
The coefficients for OWNPLT,,  and In  E,,  * OWNPLT,,  are 0.580 and 
-0.1 15. Both are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These estimates 
suggest that  labor productivity  for a typical  existing plant  is 23.5 percent 238  Robert H. McGuckin, Sang V.  Nguyen, and Arnold P.  Reznek 
~~ 
Table 6.8 
Independent  Model I  Model I1  Model El  Model IV  Model V  Model VI 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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Notes:  Dependent variables is In E8, -  In RLP,,.  Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
+Significant at the 5 percent level. 
higher for an acquiring firm than for a nonacquiring firm. Using weighted esti- 
mates, we also find that productivity growth is higher in acquiring firms’ own 
plants than in nonacquiring firms’ plants by about 10 percent. 
Plant Closing Equation 
The probit regression results reported in table 6.9 show that the coefficients 
for OC,,,,  are negative and significant in all models. This indicates that plants 
experiencing ownership change are less likely to be closed than plants not 
changing owners. The coefficient for OWNPLT,  is negative and significant 
with the linear models (models I and 11); however, this coefficient becomes 
significantly positive in the nonlinear models (models I11 and IV). The coeffi- 239  Measuring the Impact of Ownership Change on Labor 
Table 6.9  Probit Regressions of Plant Closure 
Model I  Model I1  Model 111  Model IV 
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In E?,, 
In  RLP:, 
OC,,  78*ln 4, 
OC,,  ,,*In  RLP,, 
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In  E7,*ln RLP,, 
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Notes: Dependent variable is plant closure (equals one if the plant was closed by 1987, zero other- 
wise). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
'Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
cients for the interaction terms OWNPLT,  * RLP,,  and OWNPLT,  * In  E,, 
are negative and significant. These estimates imply that small plants originally 
owned by acquirers are more likely to be closed than those owned by  nonac- 
quirers. However, for larger plants nonacquirers are more likely to close plants 
than acquirers. To better assess the probability of  plant closure, we  used the 
parameter estimates for a probit model reported in table 6.8 to estimate the 
probabilities of plant closure for plants that experienced ownership change and 
plants originally owned by acquirers and nonacquirers. 
The results reported in table 6.10 show that plants owned by  nonacquirers 
were most likely to be closed and plants that had ownership change are most 
likely to survive. The unconditional probability of closure (model I) for plants 
owned by  nonacquirers is .62, while that for plants having ownership change 
is .17. The probability of closing for acquirers' own plants is .46. When con- 240  Robert H. McGuckin, Sang V.  Nguyen, and Arnold P.  Reznek 
Table 6.10 
Plant Qpe  Model I  Model ll  Model III  Model IV 
Probabilities of Plant Closings 
Plant had ownership change  ,1708  ,1525  .I329  ,1519 
Acquirer’s own plants  ,4550  ,4323  ,3838  ,4120 
Nonacquirer’s own plants  ,6236  .6322  .6011  .6326 
trolling for initial productivity and employment size and allowing nonlinearity, 
we find similar results. The evidence suggests that plants changing owners had 
a much greater chance to survive than plants not changing owners. Acquirers’ 
own plants are less likely to be closed than those originally owned by nonac- 
quirers. 
6.7  Discussion 
Our regression results can be summarized as follows. The firm-level results 
suggest that, on  average, acquiring firms increased both employment and 
wages faster than nonacquiring firms. Using the firm-level specifications, the 
rate of increase for employment is 55 percent faster, while that for wages is in 
the 2.5-3.0  percent faster range. However, acquiring firms’ labor productivity 
grew about 16.5 percent slower. While these estimates-especially  those for 
employment and productivity-are  large in magnitude, they are not statisti- 
cally significant. 
At first glance, these estimates, especially the 55 percent figure, seem to be 
economically significant; but they are misleading because comparing a whole 
firm before and after ownership change does not isolate the effects of owner- 
ship change on the firm. Ownership change is one of many changes in compo- 
sition that typically occur in acquiring firms. The possibilities for misinterpre- 
tation of a firm-level change can be illustrated by considering, for example, a 
firm with 50 employees in 1977 that purchases another firm that also has 50 
employees in 1977. If the acquiring firm has 90 workers in 1987, one might 
conclude that its employment increased by 80 percent, from 50 to 90 employ- 
ees. However, the true effect of this acquisition is a 10 percent decline in total 
employment: the combined firm fell from 100 to 90 employees. (A more so- 
phisticated way to estimate the impact of mergers might include projections of 
each plant’s employment growth based on the average growth for plants classi- 
fied in the same industry and then do the calculation.) The key issue is knowing 
what to hold constant in assessing the impact of mergers. 
Using the plant-level specifications, we found a typical plant acquired dur- 
ing 1977-82  showed increases in wages, employment, and labor productivity 
of about 12, 16, and 16 percent, respectively, higher than for the typical plant 
of a nonacquiring firm. The growth rates of productivity and employment of 
the typical worker in plants acquired during 1977-82  were also higher, about 
4.5  and 13 percent, respectively. However, the growth rate of wages for a typi- 241  Measuring the Impact of Ownership Change on Labor 
cal worker in nonacquiring firms’ plants was about 2 percent lower than that 
of a typical worker in acquired plants during this period. The results for the 
1982-87  subperiod were similar except for productivity, for which we found 
insignificant effects. As we noted, we think this is because integration of ac- 
quired properties takes time and productivity gains probably lag labor force 
adjustments. The growth rates of employment, wages, and productivity at the 
typical acquiring firm’s existing plant grew about 9, 9.5, and 23.5 percent, re- 
spectively, faster than those of a typical nonacquiring firm’s plant. The typical 
worker in these plants also gained in wages, employment, and productivity 
growth, about 5.5, 13.5, and 10 percent, respectively, higher than the corre- 
sponding growth rates for a typical worker in nonacquiring firms’ plants. 
The above results show that ownership change had stronger positive effects 
on the typical plant than on the typical worker, particularly  with respect to 
wages and productivity. For example, the growth rate of  wages at a typical 
acquired plant was about  12 percent higher than that at a typical plant of an 
acquiring firm, whereas the typical worker in an acquired plant enjoyed wage 
growth only about 1.4 percent higher than that of a typical worker in a nonac- 
quiring firm. Similarly, productivity growth in a typical plant acquired during 
1977-82  increased about 16 percent more than that in a typical nonacquiring 
plant.  In  contrast,  the typical  worker employed in a plant acquired during 
1977-82  worked in a plant with a productivity growth increase only about 4.0 
percent higher than that of a plant that employed a typical nonacquiring firm 
worker. The reason for these differences is that wages and productivity grew 
more slowly in large acquired plants than in smaller plants. Because the large 
plants employed a substantial number of workers, weighting the effect of own- 
ership change by  employment reduces  the measurement  effect on a typical 
worker. 
Comparing the plant-level results to those obtained using firm-level data, 
we find that both suggest ownership change has positive effects on employ- 
ment and wages. But with respect to productivity, the firm-level results suggest 
a negative effect of ownership change, while the plant-level results  show a 
positive effect of ownership change on labor productivity, especially for plants 
that were acquired during 1977-82.  But all the estimates associated with own- 
ership change in the firm-level regressions  are statistically  insignificant. In 
contrast, the plant-level results are generally significant and positive. As al- 
ready discussed, while firm-level regressions fail to capture changes in the 
composition of the firm, plant-level specifications account for individual com- 
ponents of the firm. Thus they allow us to isolate the effects of ownership 
change. 
The finding that wages of workers in the typical acquired plant grew faster 
than those in the typical nonacquiring firm’s plant is striking and does not sup- 
port the notion that acquisitions and mergers cut wages. This result holds for 
all plants undergoing ownership change in both the 1977-82  and 1982-87 peri- 
ods, even after controlling for the effects of  plant initial employment,  size, 242  Robert H. McGuckin, Sang V.  Nguyen, and Arnold P.  Reznek 
wages, productivity, changes in technology, and (four-digit) industry. This re- 
sult is inconsistent with both Brown and Medoff‘s (1988) and Lichtenberg and 
Siegel’s (1992a) findings that wage changes associated with ownership change 
are relatively small. However, the Brown-Medoff evidence is based on firm- 
level data. In this regard, our results are not inconsistent with theirs. The differ- 
ence between Lichtenberg and Siegel’s results and ours needs to be explained 
because both studies use plant-level data. 
As discussed before, Lichtenberg and Siegel use a sample of  very large 
plants, but we think the difference is mainly due to the fact that they classify 
plants in  their sample into only two categories: acquired plants and nonac- 
quired plants. In contrast, we classify plants into four categories: plants ac- 
quired during 1977-82,  plants acquired during 1982-87,  acquiring firms’ ex- 
isting (own) plants, and nonacquiring firms’ existing (own) plants. Lichtenberg 
and Siegel’s categorization puts acquiring firms’ existing own plants together 
with nonacquiring firms’ own plants in one group and compares them with all 
acquired plants. Because employment, wages, and productivity of acquiring 
firms’ existing own plants grew faster than those of nonacquiring firms’ plants, 
grouping these plants together would bias the results. 
Our finding that  ownership change has  a  significant, positive effect on 
plants’ employment growth is not consistent with the findings of either Lich- 
tenberg and Siegel or Brown and Medoff. Again, we think that this difference 
is due to our explicit introduction of individual components of firms into the 
regression. Moreover, in contrast to Lichtenberg and Siegel, who use data for 
large plants, we include small-plant data in our sample. In view of our results 
that large acquired plants increase their employment relatively slowly, their 
finding of a negative (but small) effect of ownership change on employment is 
not  surprising. Overall, we  find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
ownership change destroys jobs by either reducing employment in surviving 
plants or increasing the probability of plants’ closing. This, together with the 
result that acquired plants are less likely to be closed than nonacquiring firms’ 
plants, provides strong evidence against the notion that mergers and acquisi- 
tions reduce employment. 
Finally, when using the firm as the unit of analysis, we find no statistically 
significant effects of ownership change on productivity, wages, and employ- 
ment.20  This result is extremely important. It points to the fact that assessing 
the impact of ownership change (including mergers and acquisitions) on the 
structure and performance of firms requires a careful look at individual compo- 
nents-establishments-of  the firms. Mueller (1993) correctly pointed out 
that “any real consequences of a merger must come about through changes in 
the development of  one or both joining units that can be attributed to the 
merger in the following years” (emphasis in original). Our firm-level results 
20. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) use firm-level data to estimate  productivity growth equations 
in which acquiring firms are classified into two groups: full mergers and divestitures. They obtain 
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demonstrate that simply looking at the performance of firms before and after 
ownership change fails to capture the effects of ownership change and the dif- 
ferent factors at work. 
Before concluding, we note that our data do not cover auxiliary establish- 
ments. Lichtenberg and Siege1  (1992b) find that failure to account for auxiliary 
establishments leads to an underestimate of productivity gains associated with 
ownership change. However, this indicates that including auxiliary establish- 
ment data would strengthen, rather than weaken, our finding that ownership 
change improved productivity. 
Regarding wages and employment, if ownership change results in reduced 
wages and employment in auxiliary establishments as indicated by the Lich- 
tenberg-Siege1 study, our estimates of employment and wage growth are likely 
to be biased upward. We note, however, that this bias is most likely to be seri- 
ous in the case of large multiunit firms. For smaller firms, the bias may be less 
important; and it does not exist in the case of single-unit firms. 
6.8  Concluding Remarks 
A wide range of recent empirical work with establishment-level data finds 
within-industry differences between establishments to be the major source of 
variation in productivity, wages, and jobs. For example, Davis, Haltiwanger, 
and Schuh (1996) report a greater range of variation in job changes between 
plants in the steel industry than the range of difference between the average 
establishments in the steel and textile industries. Similarly, Davis and Halti- 
wanger (1 992) and Bernard and Jensen (1994) show that most of the variation 
in wages occurs within industries. Moreover, Baily et al. (1992) demonstrate 
that the within-industry variation in productivity growth is primarily associated 
with movements between establishments. In the Baily et al. study it is gains in 
market  share by  high-productivity  plants  and  the exit  of  low-productivity 
plants that drive industry-level changes in productivity. Entry plays a signifi- 
cant but much smaller role in productivity growth, according to these studies. 
Taken together, these  studies convincingly  demonstrate that  between-plant 
variation is important for productivity, wages, and job reallocations. 
The evidence developed in this study shows that, at least for food industry 
establishments, ownership change is associated with increased  productivity 
and employment growth. For wages the impacts are very  small. Acquiring 
firms are high-productivity firms that acquire plants with above average pro- 
ductivity and improve them. This suggests that ownership change is an impor- 
tant part of the process of reallocating resources from lower to higher valued 
plants  found in  these  earlier plant-level  studies. The result  that  ownership 
change is associated with productivity growth appears robust across the U.S. 
manufacturing sector for the period studied, the late 1970s and 1980s.*' Thus, 
2 1. Our preliminary results based on data for the entire manufacturing sector appear to be con- 
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ownership change fits  well  within  a  framework emphasizing productivity 
growth through reallocations of labor from lower to higher productivity firms. 
While the benefits associated with changing ownership-movement  of  re- 
sources from lower to higher valued uses-may  be large, the costs also can be 
significant. The often expressed hostility toward mergers-by  labor unions and 
the press-reflects  the view that the costs are high. Typically cited effects of 
ownership change are closed plants and shifts of production to areas with low 
labor costs. The combination of high costs and benefits makes the study of 
ownership change a prime area for applied research. 
While we think this work is in the right direction, the results obtained should 
be considered suggestive rather than conclusive. Several reasons for this have 
been discussed. First, we use data for only one industry, although it is one of 
the most active in terms of ownership change in the period we study. Second, 
we do not include data for central offices in the analysis. Third, our models do 
not take into account potential endogeneity of ownership change, and hence, 
the results may be subject to simultaneity biases. Finally, our data cover only 
the 1977-87  period, and therefore other merger waves are excluded from the 
analysis. Despite these shortcomings,  we think the results strongly suggest that 
ownership change is an important avenue for enhancing productivity in job 
reallocation. Most important, we think that further examination of  this issue 
must proceed with plant-level models. 
In closing, we note that we plan to continue this line of research on several 
fronts. Our immediate plan is twofold: to extend the data set in time to account 
for more than one merger wave and to include other industries. We  also plan 
to extend the data set to include data for auxiliary establishments such as cen- 
tral offices. Finally, rather than looking at total employment, further research 
should treat production workers and nonproduction workers separately. This 
would shed more light on the impact of ownership change on wages and shifts 
in the skill distribution of workers within the firm. 
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COIWIlent  Frank R. Lichtenberg 
This paper represents a very useful extension and contribution to the literature 
on the “real” (ex post) effects of ownership change (as opposed to its effects 
on investor expectations, as measured in “event studies” of stock prices). The 
period studied in the paper (1977-87)  is more recent than that studied in Lich- 
tenberg and Siegel’s (1987) analysis of 1972-81  ownership changes (although 
Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990a studied the effects of leveraged buyouts-a  spe- 
cific type of ownership change-that  occurred through 1986). Hence, the au- 
thors’ sample period includes most of the takeover wave of  the 1980s. Their 
sample also includes a substantial number of  small plants, whereas previous 
studies were based primarily on large plants. 
On the other hand, they study a single industry-food  manufacturing- 
whereas previous studies of ownership change have analyzed data for the entire 
manufacturing sector, if not also nonmanufacturing industries. (I have no par- 
ticular reason to believe that the food industry is atypical with regard to the 
effects of  ownership change, however.) Their sample also excludes central 
administrative offices and auxiliary establishments; Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990b) showed that the largest (most negative) employment and wage re- 
sponses to ownership change often occur in these establishments  and that these 
need to be accounted for to obtain accurate estimates of productivity effects. 
Frank R. Lichtenberg is the Courtney C. Brown Professor of Business at the Columbia Univer- 
sity Graduate School of Business and a research associate  of the National Bureau of Economic  Re- 
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Ownership change is a reasonably frequent event: about 10 to 15 percent of 
workers are employed in plants that will be acquired in the next five years, and 
50 percent of workers are employed by firms that will engage in acquisitions 
in that period. The authors make a convincing case that using firm-level data 
to determine the effects of ownership change is far from optimal and may yield 
quite distorted estimates of  these effects. This is not very surprising,  since 
many changes in ownership involve only parts (often small parts) of firms; for 
example, a firm may decide to “spin off” one of its minor divisions. 
I will therefore focus on their plant-level analysis of the effects of ownership 
change. The authors reexamine the question of whether it is relatively efficient 
(high productivity  level) or inefficient plants that are most  likely to subse- 
quently undergo ownership change. The authors find that among large plants 
the correlation between initial productivity and ownership change is negative: 
inefficient plants are more likely to subsequently change owners. This is con- 
sistent with Lichtenberg and Siegel’s (1987) findings, which were also based 
primarily on large plants. 
However, when they include small as well as large plants in their sample, 
they reach the opposite conclusion: “It is high, not low, productivity establish- 
ments that are most likely to experience ownership change.” Thus the negative 
correlation between initial productivity and ownership change (which is im- 
plied by the “managerial discipline theory” of ownership change) “only” ap- 
plies to large plants. But most people are employed, most wages are paid, and 
most output  is produced in  large plants. In  1982, for example, there  were 
335,000 small establishments (less than 250 employees) and 13,000 large es- 
tablishments (250 or more employees) in U.S. manufacturing, but large estab- 
lishments employed more people and their aggregate value added and invest- 
ment were respectively about 60 and 94 percent larger than those of  small 
establishments. 
The finding that there are significant differences  between  the  ownership 
change behavior of  small and large plants is certainly interesting and merits 
further study and explanation. But in their analysis of the full sample of plants, 
the authors implicitly give equal weight to large and small plants; since small 
plants are far more numerous, their overall estimates are dominated by these 
plants. This does not seem to be the appropriate way to determine the aggregate 
or (weighted) average effect of ownership change. 
In the conclusion of  the paper, the authors claim that “ownership change 
is associated with increased productivity and employment growth.” But their 
estimates of  the productivity change equation based on plant-level data (re- 
ported  in table 6.8) do not seem to support this. These estimates are fairly 
unstable, and it is difficult to know what we can conclude from them. In the 
simplest models (I and 11) of productivity change, the coefficient on ownership 
change is negative and significant. When the authors allow the effect of owner- 
ship change on productivity growth to depend on plant size by  including an 
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IV), their results imply that ownership change has a positive effect on produc- 
tivity growth only for very small plants (those with fewer than 20 employees). 
Again, the appropriateness of giving equal weight to small and large plants 
seems questionable, especially when the effect (sign as well as magnitude) of 
ownership change seems to be so size related. 
The estimates also imply that the effect of ownership change on the rate of 
plant productivity growth between 1977 and 1987 depends crucially on when 
in that period the ownership change occurred. Only ownership changes during 
the first five years appeared to have a significant effect (table 6.8, models V 
and VI). (Also, ownership changes occumng during the 1983-87 period had a 
significant positive effect on employment growth, but those during 1977-82 
did not.) The authors conjecture that this may be due to the fact that “it takes 
some time for acquiring firms to integrate with purchased plants.”  Indeed, 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), who analyzed annual data on productivity and 
ownership change, found support for the gradual adjustment hypothesis. But 
the stark contrast between the estimated effects of  “early” and “late” (and 
small plant and large plant) ownership changes is somewhat troubling to me. 
I think that additional empirical research (e.g., on other industries) is needed 
to assess whether these apparent differences reflect signal rather than noise. If 
these patterns are confirmed, they will constitute a new (and difficult!) set of 
stylized facts for future theorists of ownership change to explain. 
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